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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Larry Dean Corwin appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence and a 
persistent violator enhancement, claiming, for the first time on appeal, that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
While on patrol just after midnight, Deputy Darrell Meacham noticed an 
oncoming truck with the high beams on, which the driver did not turn off as he 
approached the deputy's patrol car. (Tr., p.187, L.20 - p.188, L.23.) As a result, 
Deputy Meacham turned around for the purpose of making a traffic stop. (Tr., 
p.188, Ls.22-23.) Before activating his overhead lights, Deputy Meacham saw 
the truck turn into a subdivision under construction where none of the houses 
were occupied. (Tr., p.190, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Deputy Meacham initiated the 
traffic stop of the truck before it pulled back out of the subdivision. (Tr., p.248, 
Ls.8-14.) 
Deputy Meacham made contact with the driver ofJhe truck who identified 
himself as Corwin. (Tr., p.193, Ls.1-20.) While Deputy Meacham was talking to 
Corwin, he noticed Corwin's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, his speech was 
slightly slurred and his movements were "fumbling." (Tr., p.198, Ls.7-11.) Based 
on these observations, Deputy Meacham asked Corwin to perform field sobriety 
tests. (Tr., p.198, L.23 - p.199, L.2.) Corwin failed those tests and later 
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submitted to a breath test, which showed he had a blood alcohol content of 
.083/.085. (Tr., pp.201-233.) 
The state charged Corwin with driving under the influence and filed an 
Information Part II alleging Corwin is a persistent violator. (#35305 R.1, pp.26-27, 
36-38; R., pp.42-43.) The case proceeded to trial after which the jury found 
Corwin guilty of felony driving under the influence and found Corwin is a 
persistent violator. (R., pp.140-142.) The court imposed an enhanced unified 
30-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.186-189.) Corwin filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.191-194.) 
1 The charges in this case were originally filed in 2007 and Corwin was convicted 
in 2008. (R., pp.5-6.) Corwin appealed. (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 
35305.) After Corwin filed his opening brief, the state and Corwin filed a 
stipulation to vacate his judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new 
trial. (Stipulation for Vacation of Judgment, Remand for a New Trial, and 
Dismissal of Appeal, Docket No. 35305.) The ldahq Supreme Court granted the 
relief requested in the stipulation. (Order to Vacate Judgment; Remand for New 
Trial and Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice, Docket No. 35305.) The Reporter's 
Transcript and Clerk's Record from Corwin's prior appeal has been augmented to 
the record on appeal in this case. (R., p.2.) 
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ISSUE 
Corwin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, ns1ng to the level of a 
fundamental error, during closing arguments when the prosecutor 
mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments, appealed to the passion 
and prejudice of the jury, and misstated the law regarding the jury's 
right to determine all facts relevant to the issues at trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Corwin failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the 
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object? 
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ARGUMENT 
Corwin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Corwin claims the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding Garwin's 
performance on one of the field sobriety tests, which remarks were not objected 
to, constituted misconduct amounting to fundamental error, (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.14-17.) Review of the complained of remarks in context and under the 
applicable legal standards shows no error, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. ~. 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Corwin Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Remarks In Rebuttal 
Corwin contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 
argument by stating the following during rebuttal: 
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr. 
Corwin was walking straight from his perspective, but not from the 
officer's perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm 
glad we're looking at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr. 
Garwin's perspective, if that was a straight line, then we're all in 
trouble because he had to -- when he fell off line, which is exactly 
what we're talking about at that point, when he stepped off line by a 
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foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over. So the line from his 
point of view was crooked and careening down onto the ground. 
That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (quoting Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17).) 
Because Corwin did not object to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, in 
order to show he is entitled to reversal of his conviction based on the 
prosecutor's comments, he must satisfy the three-part test articulated in Perry, 
which governs claims of unobjected to constitutional error. That three-part test 
requires Corwin to demonstrate that (1) "one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated"; (2) "the error [is] clear or obvious, without the 
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision"; 
and (3) "the error affected the [his] substantial rights," i.e., that it affected the 
outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of 
this standard to Corwin's claims of unpreserved error demonstrates he has failed 
to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
According to Corwin, he has satisfied the first prong of the Perry test 
because, he argues, the prosecutor's remarks "violated [his] constitutional right to 
due process and to a jury determination on the facts in three ways." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) "First," Corwin argues, "the prosecutor in this case misstated [his] 
actual arguments in his defense" by "impl[ying] that [he] was arguing to the jury 
that they had to defer to his personal assessment of his performance during the 
field sobriety tests in weighing the evidence of whether Mr. Corwin was 
intoxicated." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Corwin claims that he "never argued that 
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his own subjective assessment should control the jury's determination" but 
instead "argued that the human element could have played a role in the officer's 
assessment of Mr. Garwin's performance on this test - i.e., that it could have 
been a matter of the officer's subjective perspective while observing Mr. Corwin 
that he was not walking along a straight line." (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) This 
assertion is not supported by the record. Garwin's entire argument on this point 
was as follows: 
Other examples of the human element, the state's already 
alluded to some of them. During the walk and turn test, for 
instance, the whole issue is did Mr. Corwin step off the line, and, if 
so, how far, et cetera, but, of course, there wasn't any line. That's 
a really good example of the human element because it's entirely 
possible that Mr. Corwin was walking straight from his 
perspective, but not walking straight from the officer's 
perspective and there's just absolutely no way to determine who's 
right and who's wrong in that situation. 
(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.9 (emphasis added).) 
In response, the prosecutor basically quoted the highlighted language and 
then said, "Even with all of the evidence in this case, I'm glad that we're looking 
at this from the officer's perspective." Exactly how this "implied" to the jury that 
Corwin "was arguing ... that they had to defer to his personal assessment of his 
performance" is unclear. The comments, particularly when considered together 
and in context, were an express rejection of Corwin's claim that the jury was 
precluded from determining who was "right" and who was "wrong" about whether 
he was able to walk a straight line because of the "possible" different 
"perspectives." Urging the jury to reject Garwin's argument in this regard was 
hardly improper, particularly since the only evidence before the jury was Deputy 
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Meacham's perspective because Corwin did not testify. As such, there were no 
differing "perspectives" for the jury to consider.2 Corwin's claim that the 
prosecutor "mischaracterized" his closing argument is belied by the record; 
therefore, his contingent claim that the alleged mischaracterization violated his 
constitutional rights necessarily fails. 
Corwin next claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when, "after 
implying that Mr. Corwin had argued that the jury should view the walk-and-turn 
solely from his perspective," the prosecutor "asserted to the jury that, 'we're all in 
trouble,' if they believed Mr. Corwin's argument." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
Corwin asserts this statement "injected an appeal to the jury's fears if they 
accepted the State's characterization of [his] defense." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, it is predicated on the 
erroneous assertion that the prosecutor mischaracterized Corwin's closing 
argument in the first instance. Second, the prosecutor never said "we're all in 
trouble" if the jury "believed" Corwin's defense. What the prosecutor said was 
"we're all in trouble" if, from Corwin's perspective, "that was a straight line" 
because Corwin "stepped off line by a foot" so that "the line from his point of view 
was crooked and careening down onto the ground," which is "not the type of line 
we want a driver to follow." (Tr., p.370, Ls.9-17.) Contrary to Corwin's claims on 
appeal, these comments did not "inject[ ] an impermissible appeal to the 
passions and prejudice of jurors" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), but were a fair 
2 Indeed, the only evidence of Corwin's "perspective" on his performance of the 
field sobriety tests was his statement to Deputy Meacham that he failed the tests. 
(Tr., p.209, Ls.18-20.) 
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discussion of the evidence and a fair response to Coiwin's argument. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted) 
(noting that "both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the 
jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom" and that 
a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct and in 
the context of the entire trial"); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 
(1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the defense 
argument that preceded if'). 
Coiwin finally contends that "the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued 
to the jury that they were required to defer to Officer Meacham's assessment of 
Mr. Coiwin's performance on the field sobriety test, rather than to weigh the 
import of this evidence on their own." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) More specifically. 
Coiwin argues that the statement, "I'm glad we're looking at this from the officer's 
perspective" was a "remark" that "impl[ied] that the jury was required to measure 
and view Mr. Coiwin's performance on the field sobriety tests from the 
perspective of Officer Meacham." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) This was not 
improper because the jury's evaluation of the evidence of Coiwin's performance 
on the field sobriety tests was necessarily limited to Deputy Meacham's 
testimony because there was no other evidence presented on how Coiwin 
performed on those tests. To the extent Coiwin is suggesting that the 
prosecutor's arguments required the jury to simply accept Deputy Meacham's 
testimony as true, such a claim is not supported by the record. Any such claim 
also ignores the court's instructions to the jurors informing them that "as the sole 
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judges of the facts, [they] must determine what evidence [to] believe and what 
weight [to] attach to it" (R., p.148), they were to follow the court's instructions in 
determining guilt (R., p.147), and that the arguments of counsel are not evidence 
(R., p.144), and it ignores the legal presumption that the jurors followed those 
instructions. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) 
(citation omitted) ("We presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given 
by the trial court in reaching its verdict."). 
Because Corwin has failed to establish the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks 
were error, much less error of a constitutional magnitude, he has failed to satisfy 
the first prong of Perry. Even if Corwin could overcome the first Perry hurdle, he 
has failed to meet his burden with respect to either the second or third prongs. 
Corwin contends the alleged errors "are plain from the face of the 
appellate record and were not the result of any tactical decision on the part of 
trial counsel in failing to object" because, he argues, he "received no tactical 
benefit" from the prosecutor's statements. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This 
argument misunderstands the plain error prong. Whether Corwin feels he 
"received [a] tactical benefit" from the prosecutor's closing argument is wholly 
irrelevant to "whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." There could 
be a number of reasons a defense attorney would not object to a prosecutor's 
rebuttal remarks other than the remarks were not providing a "benefit" to the 
defendant.3 For example, perhaps defense counsel did not think the prosecutor 
3 Indeed, it is probably a rare circumstance where a defendant receives a 
"benefit" from the state's closing argument and an objection on this basis would 
be frivolous. 
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was mischaracterizing his argument, and he was surely in a better position to 
judge that than appellate counsel. Defense counsel may also subscribe to the 
belief that "[f]rom a strategic perspective," objections during closing argument 
should be limited to only "the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel 
on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of 
desperation or hyper-technicality." United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 
(9th Cir. 1991 ). 'Whatever the actual explanation," it is not apparent on the 
record, and, in any event, "Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)], 
requires [the Court] to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Molina, 934 F.2d 
at 1448. In short, prong two requires the Court to consider more than Corwin's 
belief that the decision was not strategic because he did not "benefit" from the 
prosecutor's comments and Corwin has failed to establish that the alleged errors 
were "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision." 
Also relevant to prong two is the principle that "a court should not lightly 
infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging 
meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning 
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974); see also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 
P.3d 414,439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly). Similarly, this Court should "not lightly 
infer" constitutional error based on what Corwin believes the prosecutor "implied" 
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by his arguments. (See, ~. Appellant's Brief, pp.10 ("[t]he prosecutor implied 
to the jury"); 12 ("the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued to the jury").) In 
other words, claims based on implication cannot constitute plain error where, as 
here, less damning interpretations are at least possible. 
Regarding the final prong of Perry, Corwin argues the alleged error was 
not harmless because, according to him, "the strength of the State's overall 
evidence in this case was not overwhelming." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) As an 
example, Corwin notes that "[a]lthough the State presented evidence of [his] 
breath test for alcohol that registered amounts above the legal limit, his results 
were only 0.083 and 0.085." and "a person's breath alcohol concentration varies 
over the passage of time." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This argument is without 
merit. In order to prove Corwin was driving under the influence based on his 
blood alcohol content, the state was only required to prove that Corwin's breath 
test results were .08 or above. I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). The evidence that Corwin 
exceeded .08 was "overwhelming" in that the breath results admitted at trial 
exceeded .08 and were uncontradicted. Corwin's reliance on the notion that "a 
person's breath alcohol concentration varies over the passage of time" in an 
effort to undermine the evidence presented is unpersuasive because he cites no 
evidence from which the jury could conclude that any delay in the administration 
of those tests resulted in a higher blood alcohol content than he would have had 
at the time he was arrested. To the contrary, if anything, the evidence supports 
the conclusion that Corwin's blood alcohol content was higher at the time of his 
arrest than when he provided the breath samples to Deputy Meacham. (Tr., 
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p.282, L.23 - p.283, L.9 (noting, among other things, that when "you stop 
drinking ... you start eliminating").) 
Corwin also claims the state's evidence was "not overwhelming" because 
he "exhibited no pattern of actual impairment in his driving other than his failure 
to dim his high beams when passing the officer." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This 
is not entirely accurate. As noted by Deputy Meacham, consideration of Corwin's 
driving pattern also included the fact that Corwin turned into an unoccupied 
subdivision after Deputy Meacham turned around and started following him. (Tr., 
p.192, Ls.10-17.) 
Even if Corwin's blood alcohol content and his driving pattern cannot be 
considered "overwhelming," that is not the standard for showing reversible error. 
The standard is whether the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. It did not. The remarks Corwin 
complains about are limited to Corwin's performance on one of three field 
sobriety tests. Even if the jury felt improperly compelled by the prosecutor's 
arguments to accept Deputy Meacham's conclusion that Corwin failed the walk 
and turn test, that was not the only evidence demonstrating Corwin was guilty of 
driving under the influence. In addition to the blood alcohol content and driving 
pattern, which are not the subject of any claim of error, the state also presented 
evidence that Corwin's performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus and the 
one leg stand, which are also not the source of any claimed error and which 
indicated Corwin was driving under the influence. (Tr., pp.201-204, 207-209.) 
Add to this the evidence presented regarding Corwin's appearance and 
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demeanor (Tr., p.198, Ls.4-11) and this Court can easily conclude that any error 
associated with the prosecutor's comments on the walk and turn test did not 
affect the outcome of the trial. Corwin has failed to meet his burden of 
establishing otherwise. 
Because Corwin has failed to satisfy the three-part test articulated in 
Perry, he is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Garwin's judgment of 
conviction for felony driving under the influence with a persistent violator 
enhancement. 
DA TED this ih day of June, 2012. 
Attorney General 
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